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Abstract. CSIDH is a recent quantum-resistant primitive based on the
difficulty of finding isogeny paths between supersingular curves. Recently,
two constant-time versions of CSIDH have been proposed: first by Meyer,
Campos and Reith, and then by Onuki, Aikawa, Yamazaki and Takagi.
While both offer protection against timing attacks and simple power
consumption analysis, they are vulnerable to more powerful attacks such
as fault injections. In this work, we identify and repair two oversights
in these algorithms that compromised their constant-time character. By
exploiting Edwards arithmetic and optimal addition chains, we produce
the fastest constant-time version of CSIDH to date. We then consider
the stronger attack scenario of fault injection, which is relevant for the
security of CSIDH static keys in embedded hardware. We propose and
evaluate a dummy-free CSIDH algorithm. While these CSIDH variants
are slower, their performance is still within a small constant factor of less-
protected variants. Finally, we discuss derandomized CSIDH algorithms.
Note: A previous version of this article incorrectly claimed that a test in Algo-
rithm 2 leaks information through the timing channel. We are grateful to Prof.
Onuki for point out our mistake.
1 Introduction
Isogeny-based cryptography was introduced by Couveignes [10], who defined
a key exchange protocol similar to Diffie–Hellman based on the action of an
ideal class group on a set of ordinary elliptic curves. Couveignes’ protocol was
independently rediscovered by Rostovtsev and Stolbunov [27,28], who were the
first to recognize its potential as a post-quantum candidate. Recent efforts to
make this system practical have put it back at the forefront of research in post-
quantum cryptography [13]. A major breakthrough was achieved by Castryck,
Lange, Martindale, Panny, and Renes with CSIDH [6], a reinterpretation of
Couveignes’ system using supersingular curves defined over a prime field.
The first implementation of CSIDH completed a key exchange in less than 0.1
seconds, and its performance has been further improved by Meyer and Reith [22].
However, both [6] and [22] recognized the difficulty of implementing CSIDH with
constant-time algorithms, that is, algorithms whose running time, sequence of
operations, and memory access patterns do not depend on secret data. The
implementations of [6] and [22] are thus vulnerable to simple timing attacks.
The first attempt at implementing CSIDH in constant-time was realized by
Bernstein, Lange, Martindale, and Panny [3], but their goal was to obtain a fully
deterministic reversible circuit implementing the class group action, to be used in
quantum cryptanalyses. The distinct problem of efficient CSIDH implementation
with side-channel protection was first tackled by Jalali, Azarderakhsh, Mozaffari
Kermani, and Jao [16], and independently by Meyer, Campos, and Reith [21],
whose work was improved by Onuki, Aikawa, Yamazaki, and Takagi [26].
The approach of Jalali et al. is similar to that of [3], in that they achieve
a stronger notion of constant time (running time independent from all inputs),
at the cost of allowing the algorithm to fail with a small probability. In order
to make the failure probability sufficiently low, they introduce a large number
of useless operations, which make the performance significantly worse than the
original CSIDH algorithm. This poor performance and possibility of failure re-
duces the interest of this implementation; we will not analyze it further here.
Meyer et al. take a different path: the running time of their algorithm is in-
dependent of the secret key, but not of the output of an internal random number
generator. They claim a speed only 3.10 times slower than the unprotected algo-
rithm in [22]. Onuki et al. introduced new improvements, claiming a speed-up of
27.35% over Meyer et al., i.e., a net slow-down factor of 2.25 compared to [22].
Our contribution. In this work we take a new look at side-channel protected
implementations of CSIDH. We start by reviewing the implementations in [21]
and [26]. We highlight a flaw that makes their constant-time claims disputable,
and propose a fix for it. Since this fix introduces some minor slow-downs, we
report on the performance of the revised algorithms.
Then, we introduce new optimizations to make both [21] and [26] faster: we
improve isogeny formulas for the model, and we introduce the use of optimal ad-
dition chains in the scalar multiplications. With these improvements, we obtain
a version of CSIDH protected against timing and some simple power analysis
(SPA) attacks that is 39% more efficient than [21].
Then, we shift our focus to stronger security models. All constant-time ver-
sions of CSIDH presented so far use so-called “dummy operations”, i.e., com-
putations whose result is not used, but whose role is to hide the conditional
structure of the algorithm from timing and SPA attacks that read the sequence
of operations performed from a single power trace. However, this countermeasure
is easily defeated by fault-injection attacks, where the adversary may modify val-
ues during the computation. We propose a new constant-time variant of CSIDH
without dummy operations as a first-line defence. The new version is only twice
as slow as the simple constant-time version.
We conclude with a discussion of derandomized variants of CSIDH. The ver-
sions discussed previously are “constant-time” in the sense that their running
time is uncorrelated to the secret key, however it depends on some (necessarily
secret) seed to a PRNG. While this notion of “constant-time” is usually consid-
ered good enough for side-channel protection, one may object that a compromise
of the PRNG or the seed generation would put the security of the implemen-
tation at risk, even if the secret was securely generated beforehand (with an
uncomprised PRNG) as part of a long-term or static keypair. We observe that
this dependence on additional randomness is not necessary: a simple modifica-
tion of CSIDH, already considered in isogeny-based signature schemes [11,14],
can easily be made constant-time and free of randomness. Unfortunately this
modification requires increasing substantially the size of the base field, and is
thus considerably slower and not compatible with the original version. On the
positive side, the increased field size makes it much more resistant to quantum
attacks, a non-negligible asset in a context where the quantum security of CSIDH
is still unclear; it can thus be seen as CSIDH variant for the paranoid.
Organization. In §2 we briefly recall ideas, algorithms and parameters from
CSIDH [6]. In §3 we highlight a shortcoming in [21] and [26] and propose a way to
fix it. In §4 we introduce new optimizations compatible with all previous versions
of CSIDH. In §5 we introduce a new algorithm for evaluating the CSIDH group
action that is resistant against timing and some simple power analysis attacks,
while providing protection against some fault injections. Finally, in §6 we discuss
a more costly variant of CSIDH with stronger security guarantees.
Notation. M, S, and A denote the cost of computing a single multiplication,
squaring, and addition (or subtraction) in Fp, respectively. We assume that a
constant-time equality test isequal(X,Y ) is defined, returning 1 if X = Y and 0
otherwise. We also assume that a constant-time conditional swap cswap(X,Y, b)
is defined, exchanging (X,Y ) if b = 1 (and not if b = 0).
2 CSIDH
CSIDH is an isogeny based primitive, similar to Diffie–Hellman, that can be
used for key exchange and encapsulation [6], signatures [11,14,4], and other
more advanced protocols. Compared to the other main isogeny-based primitive
SIDH [17,12], CSIDH is slower. On the positive side, CSIDH has smaller public
keys, is based on a better understood security assumption, and supports an easy
key validation procedure, making it better suited than SIDH for CCA-secure
encryption, static-dynamic and static-static key exchange. In this work we will
use the jargon of key exchange when we refer to cryptographic concepts.
CSIDH works over a finite field Fp, where p is a prime of the special form
p := 4
n∏
i=1
ℓi − 1
with ℓ1, . . . , ℓn a set of small odd primes. Concretely, the original CSIDH arti-
cle [6] defined a 511-bit p with ℓ1, . . . , ℓn−1 the first 73 odd primes, and ℓn = 587.
The set of public keys in CSIDH is a subset of all supersingular elliptic
curves defined over Fp, in Montgomery form y
2 = x3+Ax2+x, where A ∈ Fp is
called the A-coefficient of the curve.5 The endomorphism rings of these curves
are isomorphic to orders in the imaginary quadratic field Q(
√−4p). Castryck et
al. [6] choose to restrict the public keys to the horizontal isogeny class of the
curve with A = 0, so that all endomorphism rings are isomorphic to Z[
√−p].
2.1 The class group action
Let E/Fp be an elliptic curve with End(E) ∼= Z[√−p]. If a is a nonzero ideal
in Z[
√−p], then it defines a finite subgroup E[a] = ⋂α∈a ker(α), where we
identify each α with its image in End(E). We then have a quotient isogeny
φ : E → E′ = E/E[a] with kernel a; this isogeny and its codomain is well-defined
up to isomorphism. If a = (α) is principal, then φ ∼= α and E/E[a] ∼= E. Hence,
we get an action of the ideal class group Cl(Z[
√−p]) on the set of isomorphism
classes of elliptic curves E over Fp with End(E) ∼= Z[
√−p]; this action is faithful
and transitive. We write a ∗E for the image of (the class of) E under the action
of a, which is (the class of) E/E[a] above.
For CSIDH, we are interested in computing the action of small prime ideals.
Consider one of the primes ℓi dividing p + 1; the principal ideal (ℓi) ⊂ Z[√−p]
splits into two primes, namely li = (ℓi, π − 1) and l¯i = (ℓi, π + 1), where π is
the element of Z[
√−p] mapping to the Frobenius endomorphism of the curves.
Since l¯ili = (ℓi) is principal, we have l¯i = l
−1
i in Cl(Z[
√−p]), and hence
l¯i ∗ (li ∗ E) = li ∗ (¯li ∗ E) = E
for all E/Fp with End(E) ∼= Z[√−p].
2.2 The CSIDH algorithm
At the heart of CSIDH is an algorithm that evaluates the class group action
described above on any supersingular curve over Fp. Cryptographically, this
plays the same role as modular exponentiation in classic Diffie–Hellman.
The input to the algorithm is an elliptic curve E : y2 = x3 + Ax2 + x,
represented by its A-coefficient, and an ideal class a =
∏n
i=1 l
ei
i , represented by
its list of exponents (ei, . . . , en) ∈ Zn. The output is the (A-coefficient of the)
elliptic curve a ∗ E = le11 ∗ · · · ∗ lenn ∗ E.
The isogenies corresponding to li = (ℓi, π−1) can be efficiently computed us-
ing Ve´lu’s formulæ and their generalizations: exploiting the fact that #E(Fp) =
p + 1 = 4
∏
ℓi, one looks for a point R of order ℓi in E(Fp) (i.e., a point that
is in the kernels of both the multiplication-by-ℓi map and π − 1), computes the
isogeny φ : E → E/〈R〉 with kernel 〈R〉, and sets li ∗ E = E/〈R〉. Iterating this
procedure lets us compute lei ∗ E for any exponent e ≥ 0.
5 Following [8], we represent A = A′/C′ as a projective point (A′ : C′); see §4.1.1.
The isogenies corresponding to l−1i are computed in a similar fashion: this
time one looks for a point R of order ℓi in the kernel of π+1, i.e., a point in E(Fp2)
of the form (x, iy) where both x and y are in Fp (since i =
√−1 is in Fp2 \ Fp
and satisfies ip = −i). Then one proceeds as before, setting l−1i ∗ E = E/〈R〉.
In the sequel we assume that we are given an algorithm QuotientIsogeny
which, given a curve E/Fp and a point R in E(Fp2), computes the quotient
isogeny φ : E → E′ ∼= E/〈R〉, and returns the pair (φ,E′). We refer to this
operation as isogeny computation. Algorithm 1, taken from the original CSIDH
article [6], computes the class group action.
Algorithm 1: The original CSIDH class group action algorithm for su-
persingular curves over Fp where p = 4
∏n
i=1 ℓi − 1. The choice of ideals
li = (ℓi, π − 1), where π is the element of Q(√−p) is mapped to the p-th
power Frobenius endomorphism on each curve in the isogeny class, is a
system parameter. This algorithm constructs exactly |ei| isogenies for each
ideal li.
Input: A ∈ Fp such that EA : y
2 = x3 + Ax2 + x is supersingular, and an
integer exponent vector (e1, . . . , en)
Output: B such that EB : y
2 = x3 +Bx2 + x is le11 ∗ · · · ∗ l
en
n ∗EA,
1 B ← A
2 while some ei 6= 0 do
3 Sample a random x ∈ Fp
4 s← +1 if x3 +Bx2 + x is square in Fp, else s← −1
5 S ← {i | ei 6= 0, sign(ei) = s}
6 if S 6= ∅ then
7 k ←
∏
i∈S
ℓi
8 Q← [(p+ 1)/k]P , where P is the projective point with x-coordinate x.
9 for i ∈ S do
10 R← [k/ℓi]Q // Point to be used as kernel generator
11 if R 6=∞ then
12 (EB, φ)← QuotientIsogeny(EB, R)
13 Q← φ(Q)
14 (k, ei)← (k/ℓi, ei − s)
15 return B
For cryptographic purposes, the exponent vectors (e1, . . . , en) must be taken
from a space of size at least 22λ, where λ is the (classical) security parameter.
The CSIDH-512 parameters in [6] take n = 74, and all ei in the interval [−5, 5],
so that 74 log2(2·5+1) ≃ 255.99, consistent with the NIST-1 security level. With
this choice, the implementation of [6] computes one class group action in 40 ms
on average. Meyer and Reith [22] further improved this to 36 ms on average.
Neither implementation is constant-time.
2.3 The Meyer–Campos–Reith constant-time algorithm
As Meyer, Campos and Reith observe in [21], Algorithm 1 performs fewer scalar
multiplications when the key has the same number of positive and negative
exponents than it does in the unbalanced case where these numbers differ. Al-
gorithm 1 thus leaks information about the distribution of positive and negative
exponents under timing attacks. Besides this, analysis of power traces would
reveal the cost of each isogeny computation, and the number of such isogenies
computed, which would leak the exact exponents of the private key.
In view of this vulnerability, Meyer, Campos and Reith proposed in [21] a
constant-time CSIDH algorithm whose running time does not depend on the
private key (though, unlike [16], it still varies due to randomness). The essential
differences between the algorithm of [21] and classic CSIDH are as follows. First,
to address the vulnerability to timing attacks, they choose to use only positive
exponents in [0, 10] for each ℓi, instead of [−5, 5] in the original version, while
keeping the same prime p =
∏74
i=1 ℓi − 1. To mitigate power consumption anal-
ysis attacks, their algorithm always computes the maximal amount of isogenies
allowed by the exponent, using dummy isogeny computations if needed.
Since these modifications generally produce more costly group action compu-
tations, the authors also provide several optimizations that limit the slow-down
in their algorithm to a factor of 3.10 compared to [22]. These include the Elli-
gator 2 map of [2] and [3], multiple batches for isogeny computation (SIMBA),
and sample the exponents ei from intervals of different sizes depending on ℓi.
2.4 The Onuki–Aikawa–Yamazaki–Takagi constant-time algorithm
Still assuming that the attacker can perform only power consumption analysis
and timing attacks, Onuki, Aikawa, Yamazaki and Takagi proposed a faster
constant-time version of CSIDH in [26].
The key idea is to use two points to evaluate the action of an ideal, one in
ker(π−1) (i.e., in E(Fp)) and one in ker(π+1) (i.e., in E(Fp2) with x-coordinate
in Fp). This allows them to avoid timing attacks, while keeping the same primes
and exponent range [−5, 5] as in the original CSIDH algorithm. Their algorithm
also employs dummy isogenies to mitigate some power analysis attacks, as in [21].
With these improvements, they achieve a speed-up of 27.35% compared to [21].
We include pseudo-code for the algorithm of [26] in Algorithm 2, to serve
both as a reference for a discussion of a subtle leak in §3 and also as a departure
point for our dummy-free algorithm in §5.
3 Repairing constant-time versions based on Elligator
Both [21] and [26] use the Elligator 2 map to sample a random point on the
current curve EA in step 7 of Algorithm 2. Elligator takes as input a random field
element u ∈ {2, . . . , p−12 } and the Montgomery A-coefficient from the current
curve and returns a pair of points in EA[π − 1] and EA[π + 1] respectively.
Algorithm 2: The Onuki–Aikawa–Yamazaki–Takagi CSIDH algorithm for
supersingular curves over Fp, where p = 4
∏n
i=1 ℓi−1. The ideals li = (ℓi, π−
1), where π maps to the p-th power Frobenius endomorphism on each curve,
and the exponent bound vector (m1, . . . ,mn), are system parameters. This
algorithm computes exactly mi isogenies for each ℓi.
Input: A supersingular curve EA : y
2 = x3 + Ax2 + x over Fp, and an integer
exponent vector (e1, . . . , en) with each ei ∈ [−mi,mi].
Output: EB : y
2 = x3 +Bx2 + x such that EB = l
e1
1 ∗ · · · ∗ l
en
n ∗ EA.
1 (e′1, . . . , e
′
n)← (mi − |e1|, . . . ,mi − |en|) // Number of dummy computations
2 EB ← EA
3 while some ei 6= 0 or e
′
i 6= 0 do
4 S ← {i | ei 6= 0 or e
′
i 6= 0}
5 k ←
∏
i∈S
ℓi
6 u← Random
({
2, . . . , p−1
2
})
7 (T−, T+)← Elligator(EB, u) // T− ∈ EB[π − 1] and T+ ∈ EB [π + 1]
8 (P0, P1)←
(
[(p+ 1)/k]T+, [(p+ 1)/k]T−
)
9 for i ∈ S do
10 s← sign(ei) // Ideal l
s
i to be used
11 Q← [k/ℓi]P 1−s
2
// Secret kernel point generator
12 P 1+s
2
← [ℓi]P 1+s
2
// Secret point to be multiplied
13 if Q 6=∞ then
14 if ei 6= 0 then
15 (EB, ϕ)← QuotientIsogeny(EB, Q)
16 (P0, P1)←
(
ϕ(P0), ϕ(P1)
)
17 ei ← ei − s.
18 else
19 EB ← EB; P 1−s
2
← [ℓi]P 1−s
2
; e′i ← e
′
i − 1 // Dummies
20 k ← k/ℓi
21 return B
To avoid a costly inversion of u2− 1, instead of sampling u randomly, Meyer,
Campos and Reith6 follow [3] and precompute a set of ten pairs (u, (u2− 1)−1);
they try them in order until one that produces a point Q passing the test in
Step 13 is found. When this happens, the algorithm moves to the next curve, and
Elligator can keep on using the next precomputed value of u, going back to the
first value when the tenth has been reached. This is a major departure from [3],
where all precomputed values of u are tried for each isogeny computation, and the
algorithm succeeds if at least one passes the test. And indeed the implementation
of [21] leaks information on the secret via the timing channel:7 since Elligator
6 Presumably, Onuki et al. do the same, however their exposition is not clear on this
point, and we do not have access to their code.
7 The Elligator optimization is described in §5.3 of [21]. The unoptimized constant-
time version described in Algorithm 2 therein is not affected by this problem.
uses no randomness for u, its output only depends on the A-coefficient of the
current curve, which itself depends on the secret key; but the running time of
the algorithm varies and, not being correlated to u, it is necessarily correlated
to A and thus to the secret.
Fortunately this can be easily fixed by (re)introducing randomness in the
input to Elligator. To avoid field inversions, we use a projective variant: given
u 6= 0, 1 and assuming A 6= 0, we write V = (A : u2 − 1), and we want to
determine whether V is the abscissa of a projective point on EA. Plugging V
into the homogeneous equation
EA : Y
2Z2 = X3Z +AX2Z2 +XZ3
gives
Y 2(u2 − 1)2 = ((A2u2 + (u2 − 1)2)A(u2 − 1).
We can test the existence of a solution for Y by computing the Legendre symbol
of the right hand side: if it is a square, the points with projectiveXZ-coordinates
T+ = (A : u
2 − 1), T− = (−Au2 : u2 − 1)
are in EA[π − 1] and EA[π + 1] respectively, otherwise their roles are swapped.
We are left with the case A = 0. Following [3], Meyer, Campos and Reith
precompute once and for all a pair of generators T+, T− of E0[π−1] and E0[π+1],
and output those instead of random points. This choice suffers from a similar
issue to the previous one: because the points are output in a deterministic way,
the running time of the whole algorithm will be correlated to the number of
times the curve E0 is encountered during the isogeny walk.
In practice, E0 is unlikely to ever be encountered in a random isogeny walk,
except as the starting curve in the first phase of a key exchange, thus this flaw
seems hard to exploit. Nevertheless, we find it not significantly more expensive
to use a different approach, also suggested in [3]: with u 6= 0, only on E0, we
define the output of Elligator as T+ = (u : 1), T− = (−u : 1) when u3 + u is a
square, and we swap the points when u3 + u is not a square.
We summarize our implementation of Elligator in Algorithm 3, generalizing
it to the case of Montgomery curves represented by projective coefficients (see
also Section 4.1.1).
We can now prove that Algorithm 2 runs in time independent from the secret
vector (e1, . . . , en). First, assume that Elligator always returns points of order
p+1, then it is clear that the condition in Line 13 is always true, and thus that
the outer loop runs exactly max(mi) times. The only branching depending on
secrets is then the one at Line 14, however the two branches take exactly the
same time, thanks to the dummy computations.
In general, we cannot assume that Elligator always returns full order points,
however, under reasonable heuristics experimentally verified in [3],
Prob{[(p+ 1)/ℓi]T+ =∞} = Prob{[(p+ 1)/ℓi]T− =∞} = 1/ℓi
Algorithm 3: Constant-time projective Elligator
Input: A supersingular curve E(A′:C′) : C
′y2 = C′x3 + A′x2 + C′x over Fp, and
an element u ∈ {2, . . . , p−1
2
}.
Output: A pair of points T+ ∈ E(A′:C′)[π − 1] and T− ∈ E(A′:C′)[π + 1].
1 t← A′
(
(u2 − 1)u2A′
2
C′ + ((u2 − 1)C′)3
)
2 a← isequal(t, 0) // t = 0 iff A′ = 0
3 α, β ← 0, u
4 cswap(α, β, a) // α = 0 iff A′ 6= 0
5 t′ ← t+ α(u2 + 1) // t′ 6= 0
6 T+ ← (A
′ + αC′(u2 − 1) : C′(u2 − 1))
7 T− ← (−A
′u2 − αC′(u2 − 1) : C′(u2 − 1))
8 b← Legendre symbol(t′, p) // b = ±1
9 c← isequal(b,−1)
10 cswap(T+, T−, c)
11 return (T+, T−)
for any prime ℓi and any curve EB .
8 Then, even though the value of Q in Line 11
depends on the sign s of the secret exponent ei, the probability that the test in
Line 13 passes is independent of all secrets.
4 Optimizing constant-time implementations
In this section we propose several optimizations that are compatible with both
non-constant-time and constant-time implementations of CSIDH.
4.1 Isogeny and point arithmetic on twisted Edwards curves
In this subsection, we present efficient formulas in twisted-Edwards coordinates
for four fundamental operations: point addition, point doubling, isogeny compu-
tation (as presented in [25]; cf. §2.2), and isogeny evaluation (i.e. computing the
image of a point under an isogeny). Our approach obtains a modest but still no-
ticeable improvement with respect to previous proposals based on Montgomery
representation, or hybrid strategies that propound combinations of Montgomery
and twisted-Edwards representations [5,18,19,20,23].
Castryck, Galbraith, and Farashahi [5] proposed using a hybrid represen-
tation to reduce the cost of point doubling on certain Montgomery curves, by
exploiting the fact that converting between Montgomery and twisted Edwards
models can be done at almost no cost. In [23], Meyer, Reith and Campos con-
sidered using twisted Edwards formulas for computing isogeny and elliptic curve
arithmetic, but concluded that a pure twisted-Edwards-only approach would
not be advantageous in the context of SIDH. Bernstein, Lange, Martindale, and
8 Note that the joint probability of T+ and T− having order divisible by ℓi is not
independent of EB, however this will not be a problem in our algorithms.
Panny observed in [3] that the conversion from Montgomery XZ coordinates to
twisted Edwards YZ coordinates occurs naturally during the Montgomery lad-
der. Kim, Yoon, Kwon, Park, and Hong presented a hybrid model in [19] using
Edwards and Montgomery modelds for isogeny computations and point arith-
metic, respectively; in [18] and [20], they suggested computing isogenies using a
modified twisted Edwards representation that introduces a fourth coordinate w.
To the best of our knowledge, the quest for more efficient elliptic curve and
isogeny arithmetic than that offered by pure Montgomery and twisted-Edwards-
Montgomery representations remains an open problem. As a step forward in this
direction, Moody and Shumow [25] showed that when dealing with isogenies of
odd degree d = 2ℓ − 1 with ℓ ≥ 2, twisted Edwards representation offers a
cheaper formulation for isogeny computation than the corresponding one using
Montgomery curves; nevertheless, they did not address the problem of getting a
cheaper twisted Edwards formulation for the isogeny evaluation operation.
4.1.1 Montgomery curves A Montgomery curve [24] is defined by the equa-
tion EA,B : By
2 = x3+Ax2+x, such that B 6= 0 and A2 6= 4 (we often write EA
for EA,1). We refer to [9] for a survey on Montgomery curves. When performing
isogeny computations and evaluations, it is often more convenient to represent
the constant A in the projective space P1 as (A′ : C′), such that A = A′/C′.
Montgomery curves are attractive because they are exceptionally well-suited to
performing the differential point addition operation which computes x(P + Q)
from x(P ), x(Q), and x(P −Q). Equations (1) and (2) describe the differential
point doubling and addition operations proposed by Montgomery in [24]:
X[2]P = C24(XP + ZP )
2(XP − ZP )2, (1)
Z[2]P = ((XP + ZP )
2 − (XP − ZP )2)·
(C24(XP − ZP )2 +A24p((XP + ZP )2 − (XP − ZP )2))
where A24p = A+ 2C and C24 = 4C, and
XP+Q = ZP−Q [(XP − ZP )(XQ + ZQ) + (ZP + ZP )(XQ − ZQ)]2 (2)
ZP+Q = XP−Q [(XP − ZP )(XQ + ZQ)− (ZP + ZP )(XQ − ZQ)]2
Montgomery curves can be used to efficiently compute isogenies using Ve´lu’s
formulas [30]. Suppose we want the image of a point Q under an ℓ-isogeny φ,
where ℓ = 2k + 1. For each 1 ≤ i ≤ k we let (Xi : Zi) = x([i]P ), where 〈P 〉 =
kerφ. Equation (3) computes (X ′ : Z ′) = x(φ(Q)) from (XQ : ZQ) = x(Q).
X ′ = XP
( k∏
i=1
[
(XQ − ZQ)(Xi + Zi) + (ZQ + ZQ)(Xi − Zi)
])2
(3)
Z ′ = ZP
( k∏
i=1
[
(XQ − ZQ)(Xi + Zi)− (ZQ + ZQ)(Xi − Zi)
])2
4.1.2 Twisted Edwards curves In [1] we see that every Montgomery curve
EA,B : By
2 = x3+Ax2+x is birationally equivalent to a twisted Edwards curve
Ea,d : ax
2 + y2 = 1 + dx2y2; the curve constants are related by
(A,B) =
(
2(a+ d)
a− d ,
4
a− d
)
and (a, d) =
(
A+ 2
B
,
A− 2
B
)
,
and the rational maps φ : Ea,d → EA,B and ψ : EA,B → Ea,d are defined by
φ : (x, y) 7−→ ((1 + y)/(1− y), (1 + y)/(1− yx)) ,
ψ : (x, y) 7−→ (x/y, (x− 1)/(x+ 1)) . (4)
Rewriting this relationship for Montgomery curves with projective constants,
Ea,d is equivalent to the Montgomery curve E(A:C) = EA/C,1 with constants
A24p := A+ 2C = a , A24m := A− 2C = d , C24 := 4C = a− d .
To avoid notational ambiguities, we write (YP : TP ) for the P
1 projection of the
y-coordinate of the point P ∈ Ea,d. Let P ∈ E(A:C). In projective coordinates,
the map ψ of (4) becomes
ψ : (XP : ZP ) 7−→ (YP : TP ) = (XP − ZP : XP + ZP ) (5)
Comparing (5) with (1) reveals that YP and TP appear in the doubling formula,
so we can substitute them at no cost. Replacing A24p and C24 with their twisted
Edwards equivalents a and e = a−d, respectively, we obtain a doubling formula
for twisted Edwards Y T coordinates:
Y[2]P = e · Y 2P · T 2P − (T 2P − Y 2P ) · (eY 2P + a(T 2P − Y 2P )),
T[2]P = e · Y 2P · T 2P + (T 2P − Y 2P ) · (eY 2P + a(T 2P − Y 2P )).
Similarly, the coordinates YP , TP , YQ, TQ, YP−Q and TP−Q appear in (2), and
thus we derive differential addition formulas for twisted Edwards coordinates:
YP+Q = (TP−Q − YP−Q)(YPTQ + YQZP )2 − (TP−Q + YP−Q)(YPTQ − YQZP )2,
TP+Q = (TP−Q − YP−Q)(YPTQ + YQZP )2 + (TP−Q + YP−Q)(YPTQ − YQZP )2.
The computational costs of doubling and differential addition are 4M+2S+4A
(the same as evaluating (1)) and 4M+ 2S+ 6A (the same as (2)), respectively.
The Moody–Shumow formulas for isogeny computation [25] are given in
terms of twisted Edwards Y T -coordinates. It remains to derive a twisted Ed-
wards Y T -coordinate isogeny-evaluation formula for ℓ-isogenies where ℓ = 2k+1.
We do this by applying the map in (5) to (3), which yields
Y ′ = (TP−Q + YP−Q) ·
( k∏
i=1
[
TQY[i]P + YQT[i]P
] )2
− (TP−Q − YP−Q) ·
( k∏
i=1
[
TQY[i]P − YQT[i]P
] )2
,
T ′ = (TP−Q + YP−Q) ·
( k∏
i=1
[
TQY[i]P + YQT[i]P
] )2
+ (TP−Q − YP−Q) ·
( k∏
i=1
[
TQY[i]P − YQT[i]P
] )2
.
The main advantage of the approach outlined here is that by only using
points given in Y T coordinates, we can compute point doubling, point addition
and isogeny construction and evaluation at a lower computational cost. Indeed,
isogeny evaluation in XZ costs 4kM+ 2S+ 6kA, whereas the above Y T coor-
dinate formula costs 4kM+ 2S+ (2k + 4)A, thus saving 4k − 4 field additions.
4.2 Addition chains for a faster scalar multiplication
Since the coefficients in CSIDH scalar multiplications are always known in ad-
vance (they are essentially system parameters), there is no need to hide them by
using constant-time scalar multiplication algorithms such as the classical Mont-
gomery ladder. Instead, we can use shorter differential addition chains.9
In the CSIDH group action computation, any given scalar k is the product
of a subset of the collection of the 74 small primes ℓi dividing
p+1
4 . We can take
advantage of this structure to use shorter differential addition chains than those
we might derive for general scalars of a comparable size. First, we pre-computed
the shortest differential addition chains for each one of the small primes ℓi. One
then computes the scalar multiplication operation [k]P as the composition of
the differential addition chains for each prime ℓ dividing k.
Power analysis on the coefficient computation might reveal the degree of the
isogeny that is currently being computed, but, since we compute exactly one
ℓi-isogeny for each ℓi per loop, this does not leak any secret information.
This simple trick allows us to compute scalar multiplications [k]P using dif-
ferential addition chains of length roughly 1.5⌈log2(k)⌉. This yields a saving of
about 25% compared with the cost of the classical Montgomery ladder.
5 Removing dummy operations for fault-attack resistance
The use of dummy operations in the previous constant-time algorithms implies
that the attacker can obtain information on the secret key by injecting faults into
9 A differential addition chain is an addition chain such that for every chain element
c computed as a+ b, the difference a− b is already present in the chain.
variables during the computation. If the final result is correct, then she knows
that the fault was injected in a dummy operation; if it is incorrect, then the
operation was real. For example, if one of the values in Line 19 of Algorithm 2
is modified without affecting the final result, then the adversary learns whether
the corresponding exponent ei was zero at that point.
Fault injection attacks have been considered in the context of SIDH ([15],
[29]), but to the best of our knowledge, they have not been studied yet on
dummy operations in the context of CSIDH. Below we propose an approach to
constant-time CSIDH without dummy computations, making every computation
essential for a correct final result. This gives us some natural resistance to faults,
at the cost of approximately a twofold slowdown.
Our approach to avoiding fault-injection attacks is to change the format of
secret exponent vectors (e1, . . . , en). In both the original CSIDH and the Onuki
et al. variants, the exponents ei are sampled from an integer interval [−mi,mi]
centered in 0. For naive CSIDH, evaluating the action of leii requires evaluating
between 0 and mi isogenies, corresponding to either the ideal li (for positive ei)
or l−1i (for negative ei). If we follow the approach of [26], then we must also
compute mi − |ei| dummy ℓi-isogenies to ensure a constant-time behaviour.
For our new algorithm, the exponents ei are uniformly sampled from sets
S(mi) = {e | e = mi mod 2 and |e| ≤ mi},
i.e., centered intervals containing only even or only odd integers. The interesting
property of these sets is that a vector drawn from S(m)n can always be rewritten
(in a non-unique way) as a sum ofm vectors with entries {−1,+1} (i.e., vectors in
S(1)n). But the action of a vector drawn from S(1)n can clearly be implemented
in constant-time without dummy operations: for each coefficient ei, we compute
and evaluate the isogeny associated to li if ei = 1, or the one associated to l
−1
i
if ei = −1. Thus, we can compute the action of vectors drawn from S(m)n by
repeating m times this step.
More generally, we want to evaluate the action of vectors (e1, . . . , en) drawn
from S(m1)×· · ·×S(mn). Algorithm 4 achieves this in constant-time and without
using dummy operations. The outer loop at line 3 is repeated exactly max(mi)
times, but the inner “if” block at line 5 is only executed mi times for each i;
it is clear that this flow does not depend on secrets. Inside the “if” block, the
coefficients ei are implicitly interpreted as
|ei| = 1 + 1 + · · ·+ 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
ei times
+(1− 1)− (1 − 1) + (1− 1)− · · ·︸ ︷︷ ︸
mi−ei times
,
i.e., the algorithm starts by acting by l
sign(ei)
i for ei iterations, then alternates
between li and l
−1
i for mi − ei iterations. We assume that the sign : Z → {±1}
operation is implemented in constant time, and that sign(0) = 1. If one is careful
to implement the isogeny evaluations in constant-time, then it is clear that the
full algorithm is also constant-time.
However, Algorithm 4 is only an idealized version of the CSIDH group action
algorithm. Indeed, like in [21,26], it may happen in some iterations that Elligator
Algorithm 4: An idealized dummy-free constant-time evaluation of the
CSIDH group action.
Input: Secret vector (e1, . . . , en) ∈ S(m1)× · · · × S(mn)
1 (t1, . . . , tn)← (sign(e1), . . . , sign(en)) // Secret
2 (z1, . . . , zn)← (m1, . . . ,mn) // Not secret
3 while some zi 6= 0 do
4 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
5 if zi > 0 then
6 Act by ltii
7 b = isequal(ei, 0)
8 ei ← ei − ti
9 ti ← (−1)
b · ti // Swap sign when ei has gone past 0
10 zi ← zi − 1
outputs points of order not divisible by ℓi, and thus the action of li or l
−1
i cannot
be computed in that iteration. In this case, we simply skip the loop and retry
later: this translates into the variable zi not being decremented, so the total
number of iterations may end up being larger than max(mi). Like in Section 3,
if the input value u fed to Elligator is random, its output is uncorrelated to secret
values10, and thus the fact that an iteration is skipped does not leak information
on the secret. The resulting algorithm is summarized in Algorithm 5.
To maintain the security of standard CSIDH, the bounds mi must be chosen
so that the key space is at least as large. For example, the original implementa-
tion [6] samples secrets in [−5, 5]74, which gives a key space of size 1174; hence,
to get the same security we would need to sample secrets in S(10)74. But a
constant-time version of CSIDH a` la Onuki et al. only needs to evaluate five
isogeny steps per prime ℓi, whereas the present variant would need to evaluate
ten isogeny steps. We thus expect an approximately twofold slowdown for this
variant compared to Onuki et al., which is confirmed by our experiments.
6 Derandomized CSIDH algorithms
As we stressed in Section 3, all of the algorithms presented here depend on
the availability of high-quality randomness for their security. Indeed, the input
to Elligator must be randomly chosen to ensure that the total running time is
uncorrelated to the secret key. Typically, this would imply the use of a PRNG
seeded with high quality true randomness that must be kept secret. An attack
scenario where the attacker may know the output of the PRNG, or where the
quality of PRNG output is less than ideal, therefore degrades the security of all
algorithms. This is true even when the secret was generated with a high-quality
10 Assuming the usual heuristic assumptions on the distribution of the output of Elli-
gator, see [21].
Algorithm 5: Dummy-free randomized constant-time CSIDH class group
action for supersingular curves over Fp, where p = 4
∏n
i=1 ℓi−1. The ideals
li = (ℓi, π − 1), where π maps to the p-th power Frobenius endomorphism
on each curve, and the vector (m1, . . . ,mn) of exponent bounds, are system
parameters. This algorithm computes exactly mi isogenies for each ideal li.
Input: A supersingular curve EA over Fp, and an exponent vector (e1, . . . , en)
with each ei ∈ [−mi,mi] and ei ≡ mi (mod 2).
Output: EB = l
e1
1 ∗ · · · ∗ l
en
n ∗ EA.
1 (t1, . . . , tn)←
(
sign(e1)+1
2
, . . . , sign(en)+1
2
)
// Secret
2 (z1, . . . , zn)← (m1, . . . ,mn) // Not secret
3 EB ← EA
4 while some zi 6= 0 do
5 u← Random
({
2, . . . , p−1
2
})
6 (T1, T0)← Elligator(EB, u) // T1 ∈ EB[π − 1] and T0 ∈ EB [π + 1]
7 (T0, T1)← ([4]T0, [4]T1) // Now T0, T1 ∈ EB
[∏
i
ℓi
]
8 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} do
9 if zi 6= 0 then
10 (G0, G1)← (T0, T1)
11 cswap(G0, G1, ti) // Secret kernel point generator: G0
12 cswap(T0, T1, ti) // Secret point to be multiplied: T1
13 for j ∈ {i+ 1, . . . , n} do
14 G0 ← [ℓj ]G0
15 if G0 6=∞ then
16 (EB, φ)← QuotientIsogeny(EB, G0)
17 (T0, T1)←
(
φ(T0), φ(T1)
)
18 b← isequal(ei, 0)
19 ei ← ei + (−1)
ti
20 ti ← ti ⊕ b
21 zi ← zi − 1
22 T1 ← [ℓi]T1
23 cswap(T0, T1, ti)
24 return B
PRNG if the keypair is static, and the secret key is then used by an algorithm
with low-quality randomness.
We can avoid this issue completely if points of order
∏
ℓ
|mi|
i , where |mi| is
the maximum possible exponent (in absolute value) for ℓi, are available from
the start. Unfortunately this is not possible with standard CSIDH, because such
points are defined over field extensions of exponential degree.
Instead, we suggest modifying CSIDH as follows. First, we take a prime
p = 4
∏n
i=1 ℓi − 1 such that ⌈n log2(3)⌉ = 2λ, where λ is a security parameter,
and we restrict to exponents of the private key sampled from {−1, 0, 1}. Then,
we compute two points of order (p + 1)/4 on the starting public curve, one in
ker(π− 1) and the other in ker(π+1), where π is the Frobenius endomorphism.
This computation involves no secret information and can be implemented in
variable-time; furthermore, if the starting curve is the initial curve with A = 0,
or a public curve corresponding to a long term secret key, these points can be
precomputed offline and attached to the system parameters or the public key.
We also remark that even for ephemeral public keys, a point of order p+1 must
be computed anyway for key validation purposes, and thus this computation
only slows down key validation by a factor of two.
Since we have restricted exponents to {−1, 0, 1}, every ℓi-isogeny in Algo-
rithm 2 can be computed using only (the images of) the two precomputed points.
There is no possibility of failure in the test of Line 13, and no need to sample
any other point.
We note that this algorithm still uses dummy operations. If fault-injection
attacks are a concern, the exponents can be further restricted to {−1, 1}, and the
group action evaluated as in (a stripped down form of) Algorithm 5. However
this further increases the size of p, as n must now be equal to 2λ.
This protection comes at a steep price: at the 128 bits security level, the
prime p goes from 511 bits to almost 1500. The resulting field arithmetic would
be considerably slower, although the global running time would be slightly offset
by the smaller number of isogenies to evaluate.
On the positive side, the resulting system would have much stronger quantum
security. Indeed, the best known quantum attacks are exponential in the size of
the key space (≈ 22λ here), but only subexponential in p (see [7,13,6]). Since our
modification more than doubles the size of p without changing the size of the
key space, quantum security is automatically increased. For this same reason,
for security levels beyond NIST-1 (64 quantum bits of security), the size of p
increases more than linearly in λ, and the variant proposed here becomes natural.
Finally, parameter sets with a similar imbalance between the size of p and the
security parameter λ have already been considered in the context of isogeny
based signatures [11], where they provide tight security proofs in the QROM.
Hence, while at the moment this costly modification of CSIDH may seem
overkill, we believe further research is necessary to try and bridge the efficiency
gap between it and the other side-channel protected implementations of CSIDH.
7 Experimental results
Tables 1 and 2 summarize our experimental results, and compare our algorithms
with those of [6], [21], and [26]. Table 1 compares algorithms in terms of elemen-
tary field operations, while Table 2 compares cycle counts of C implementations.
All of our experiments were ran on a Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-6700K CPU 4.00GHz
machine with 16GB of RAM. Turbo boost was disabled. The software environ-
ment was the Ubuntu 16.04 operating system and gcc version 5.5.
In all of the algorithms considered here (except the original [6]), the group
action is evaluated using the SIMBA method (Splitting Isogeny computations
into Multiple BAtches) proposed by Meyer, Campos, and Reith in [21]. Roughly
speaking, SIMBA-m-k partitions the set of primes ℓi into m disjoint subsets Si
(batches) of approximately the same size. SIMBA-m-k proceeds by computing
isogenies for each batch Si; after k steps, the unreached primes ℓi from each
batch are merged.
Castryck et al. We used the reference CSIDH implementation made available
for download by the authors of [6]. None of our countermeasures or algorithmic
improvements were applied.
Meyer–Campos–Reith. We used the software library freely available from the
authors of [21]. This software batches isogenies using SIMBA-5-11. The improve-
ments we describe in §3 and §4 were not applied.
Onuki et. al. Unfortunately, the source code for the implementation in [26] was
not freely available, so direct comparison with our implementation was impossi-
ble. Table 1 includes their field operation counts for their unmodified algorithm
using SIMBA-3-8. We did not apply the optimizations of §4 here. (We do not
replicate the cycle counts from [26] in Table 2, since they may have been obtained
using turbo boost, thus rendering any comparison invalid.)
Our implementations. We implemented three constant-time CSIDH algorithms,
using the standard primes with the exponent bounds mi from [26, §5.2].
MCR-style This is essentially our version of Meyer–Campos–Reith (with one
torsion point and dummy operations, batching isogenies with SIMBA-5-11),
but applying the techniques of §3 and §4.
OAYT-style This is essentially our version of Onuki et. al. (using two torsion
points and dummy operations, batching isogenies with SIMBA-3-8), but ap-
plying the techniques of §3 and §4.
No-dummy This is Algorithm 5 (with two torsion points and no dummy op-
erations), batching isogenies using SIMBA-5-11.
In each case, the improvements and optimizations of §3-4 are applied, includ-
ing projective Elligator, short differential addition chains, and twisted Edwards
arithmetic and isogenies. Our software library is freely available from
https://github.com/JJChiDguez/csidh .
The field arithmetic is based on the Meyer–Campos–Reith software library [21];
since the underlying arithmetic is essentially identical, the performance compar-
isons below reflect differences in the CSIDH algorithms.
Results. We see in Table 2 that the techniques we introduced in §3 and §4 pro-
duce substantial savings compared with the implementation of [21]. In particular,
our OAYT-style implementation yields a 39% improvement over [21]. Since the
implementations use the same underlying field arithmetic library, these improve-
ments are entirely due to the techniques introduced in this paper. While our no-
dummy variant is (unsurprisingly) slower, we see that the performance penalty
is not prohibitive: it is less than twice as slow as our fastest dummy-operation
algorithm, and only 22% slower than [21].
Table 1. Field operation counts for constant-time CSIDH. Counts are given in millions
of operations, averaged over 1024 random experiments. The performance ratio uses [21]
as a baseline, considers only multiplication and squaring operations, and assumes M =
S.
Implementation CSIDH Algorithm M S A Ratio
Castryck et al. [6] unprotected, unmodified 0.252 0.130 0.348 0.26
Meyer–Campos–Reith [21] unmodified 1.054 0.410 1.053 1.00
Onuki et al. [26] unmodified 0.733 0.244 0.681 0.67
This work
MCR-style 0.901 0.309 0.965 0.83
OAYT-style 0.657 0.210 0.691 0.59
No-dummy 1.319 0.423 1.389 1.19
Table 2. Clock cycle counts for constant-time CSIDH implementations, averaged over
1024 experiments. The ratio is computed using [21] as baseline implementation.
Implementation CSIDH algorithm Mcycles Ratio
Castryck et al. [6] unprotected, unmodified 155 0.39
Meyer–Campos–Reith [21] unmodified 395 1.00
This work
MCR-style 337 0.85
OAYT-style 239 0.61
No-dummy 481 1.22
8 Conclusion and perspectives
We studied side-channel protected implementations of the isogeny based prim-
itive CSIDH. Previous implementations failed at being constant time because
of a subtle mistake. We fixed the problem, and proposed new improvements, to
achieve the most efficient version of CSIDH protected against timing and simple
power analysis attacks to date. All of our algorithms were implemented in C,
and the source made publicly available online.
We also studied the security of CSIDH in stronger attack scenarios. We pro-
posed a protection against some fault-injection and timing attacks that only
comes at a cost of a twofold slowdown. We also sketched an alternative version
of CSIDH “for the paranoid”, with much stronger security guarantees, however
at the moment this version seems too costly for the security benefits; more work
is required to make it competitive with the original definition of CSIDH.
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